Taking Power - History

Taking Power - History

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President Kennedy knew he had to prioritize the goals he wanted to achieve as President. He choose to concentrate his initial actions on pushing to get the economy moving. He decided to put off other matters until later in his Presidency. Kennedy knew he had to harness the enthusiasm his elections had brought to give the American people a sense that America was moving again. JFK successfully did that. He made sure that America, and the world saw the image of a young and vigorous President ready to lead America forward.

John F. Kennedy assumed the Presidency well-aware of the limitations of the office. He knew that a President was often the hostage of events that were beyond his control. He was determined, however, to seize the initiative.

Kennedy was keenly aware that one of the major challenges the US faced was economic. On January 30, 1961 he spoke to Congress about the state of the economy and pledged to make the economy his major concern. He stated, " We take office in the wake of seven months of recession, three and one-half years of slack, seven years of diminished economic growth, and nine years of falling farm income. " While his speech was well received he knew that he would have a difficult time getting the conservative Congress (with a democratic majority) to pass any sweeping legislation. Thus, he relied on issuing executive orders whenever he could. One of his first executive orders, for example, was issued to improve food distribution to the unemployed.

Kennedy also believed he would have a hard time getting approval for any civil rights legislation, so his initial actions in that area were taken as executive orders, as well. He established the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. The overarching goal was to eliminate discrimination against African American in the hiring practice of the Federal government and its contractors. It was in the area of foreign affairs, however, that the fate of a Presidency could be determined. While Kennedy did not obsess about the possibility of nuclear war, the concern about such a prospect was never far from his mind. As events of his Presidency were to prove, the country and the world would face the possibility of just such a disaster during this President's term as would never be seen again. Kennedy was determined to do all he could to avoid such an eventuality, without giving in to Soviet intimidation. His inauguration was marked by a small Soviet gesture the release of two American airmen held by the USSR. A conciliatory letter from Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev accompanied the release. Kennedy hoped to capitalize on the two events to try to lower tensions with the Soviets. He was under no illusion that the US no longer faced a grave and continued threat from the Soviets. One area of major concern in the early days of the Administration was the situation in South East Asia €“ Vietnam and Laos. Soon after assuming office, Kennedy signed off on an additional commitment of US forces to train the South Vietnamese military.

Among Kennedy's first major initiatives -- and one that proved to be his most popular and enduring -- was the Peace Corps. He issued an executive order on March 1, 1961 establishing the organization, and appointed his brother-in law Sargent Shriver to head it. The goal of the Peace Corps was to send American volunteers to underdeveloped countries to help fight poverty and educate the people. The President's hope was that these young Americans would be America's best ambassadors, and would help counteract communist agitations in many underdeveloped countries. The program was extremely popular with more than three-quarters of Americans expressing support for it.

Kennedy was also determined to reach out and strengthen US ties to South America. In a March 13, 1961 speech to Congressional leaders and South American ambassadors, Kennedy said, referring to freedom in the Western Hemisphere " Never in the long history of our hemisphere has this been nearer to fulfillment, and never has it been in greater danger. " The President established the Alliance for Progress to benefit the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

President Kennedy knew that in order to maintain his momentum, he needed to develop a direct connection to the American public. From the beginning of his administration, he held weekly live press conferences, giving the members of the press unprecedented access to a President. He quickly became a favorite of the press, thanks to his witty repartee and relaxed charm.

All of his initial steps resonated well with the public. By the middle of March, his approval rating ranged from 75% to an astonishing 90% depending on the poll.

Communists take power in Czechoslovakia

Under pressure from the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, President Edvard Benes allows a communist-dominated government to be organized. Although the Soviet Union did not physically intervene (as it would in 1968), Western observers decried the virtually bloodless communist coup as an example of Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe.

The political scene in Czechoslovakia following World War II was complex, to say the least. Edvard Benes was head of the London-based Czech government-in-exile during the war, and returned to his native land in 1945 to take control of a new national government following the Soviet withdrawal in July of that year. National elections in 1946 resulted in significant representation for leftist and communist parties in the new constituent assembly. Benes formed a coalition with these parties in his administration.

Although Czechoslovakia was not formally within the Soviet orbit, American officials were concerned with the Soviet communist influence in the nation. They were particularly upset when Benes’ government strongly opposed any plans for the political rehabilitation and possible rearmament of Germany (the U.S. was beginning to view a rearmed Germany as a good line of defense against Soviet incursions into western Europe). In response, the United States terminated a large loan to Czechoslovakia. Moderate and conservative parties in Czechoslovakia were outraged, and declared that the U.S. action was driving their nation into the clutches of the communists. Indeed, the communists made huge electoral gains in the nation, particularly as the national economy spiraled out of control.

When moderate elements in the Czech government raised the possibility of the nation’s participation in the U.S. Marshall Plan (a massive economic recovery program designed to help war torn European countries rebuild), the communists organized strikes and protests, and began clamping down on opposition parties. Benes tried desperately to hold his nation together, but by February 1948 the communists had forced the other coalition parties out of the government. On February 25, Benes gave in to communist demands and handed his cabinet over to the party. Rigged elections were held in May to validate the communist victory. Benes then resigned and his former foreign minister Jan Masaryk died under very suspicious circumstances. Czechoslovakia became a single-party state.

The response from the West was quick but hardly decisive. Both the United and Great Britain denounced the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, but neither took any direct action. Perhaps having put too much faith in Czechoslovakia’s democratic traditions, or possibly fearful of a Soviet reaction, neither nation offered anything beyond verbal support to the Benes government. The Communist Party, with support and aid from the Soviet Union, dominated Czechoslovakian politics until the so-called “Velvet Revolution” of 1989 brought a non-communist government to power. In 1993,਌zechoslovakia split into the਌zech Republic and Slovakia. 


Pennsylvania Coal Edit

In 1922, the Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that governmental regulations that went "too far" were a taking. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the majority of the court, stated that "[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." [1] Before the court, was a Pennsylvanian law that forbade all mining under inhabited land. The Court held this law to be a taking of the coal owned by the Pennsylvania Coal Company. [1]

The early mining operations often removed so much of the underground coal that the mines became a hazard to the miners underground and to those residing on the surface. For this reason, the Pennsylvania legislature acted to limit the amount of material that could be removed from the mines below in order to leave sufficient underground support below. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon involved an action by an individual landowner who sought to prevent a mining operation from violating this law, undermining his or her home. Under Pennsylvania law, the deed also conveyed the right to surface support to the coal company which could thus remove subsurface coal even if that caused subsidence. The coal companies argued in Pennsylvania Coal that they had acquired a right to mine the coal and the right to allow the surface to collapse because these rights had been purchased from the original landowners. The owner's deed conveyed the surface but in express terms reserved the right to remove all the coal. The state and the surface landowners argued that the right to cause surface collapse was not property. [1] The deed provided that the grantee takes the premises with that risk and waives all claim for damages that may arise from mining out the coal. The coal company essentially owned a property right to mine as much as it wished. Over a dissent by Justice Brandeis, the court ruled that Pennsylvania's statute deprived the coal companies of the right to mine their coal. [1]

The Holmes opinion is considered one of the most important opinions in the history of takings law. [2]

Penn Central Edit

The "polestar" of regulatory takings jurisprudence is Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City (1973). [3] In Penn Central, the Court denied a takings claim brought by the owner of Grand Central Terminal following refusal of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission to approve plans for construction of 50-story office building over Grand Central Terminal. Penn Central contended that under the New York Historical Preservation Law, it was entitled to derive a net income from Grand Central Terminal, but the city's regulation had forced it into an indefinite deficit condition. The trial court agreed but its decision was reversed on appeal.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that: the owners could not establish a "taking" merely by showing that they had been denied the right to exploit the superadjacent airspace, irrespective of the remainder of the parcel the fact that the law affected some owners more severely than others did not itself result in a "taking," and that the law did not interfere with owners' present use or prevent it from realizing a reasonable rate of return on its investment, especially since preexisting air rights were transferable to other parcels in the vicinity, which acted as a form of compensation for the claimed taking of air rights. [4]

The court laid out a three-part ad hoc test to consider whether a regulatory taking had occurred:

  1. the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,
  2. the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations and
  3. the character of the governmental action.

These factors have been criticized because the court failed to provide guidance as to exactly what they mean, what must be proven to establish a taking using them as a test, and whether all three, two, or any one of them is sufficient to show a taking. [3]

Investment-backed expectations factor Edit

The investment-backed expectations factor has largely been unclear. [3] In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., the Supreme Court stated that that "those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end." [3] However, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority of the court suggested that the expectations were on "how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property." [3]

Character of the governmental action Edit

The character of the governmental action can immediately determine whether the regulation is a taking. For instance, a taking has occurred when a government regulation creates a permanent physical occupation of a landowner's property. [5] This rule comes from Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. which found that a New York law that required property owners to have cable television wires on their property was a taking which required just compensation. [6]

Regulatory restriction on use of property Edit

In contrast, a regulation restricting the use of property to further legitimate public ends, will not be considered a taking merely because it impairs the value or the utility of that land. However, when the regulation goes too far (as Justice Holmes put it in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon), it will be judicially recognized as the equivalent of a taking which may not take place without payment of just compensation to the property's owner.

The issue of regulatory takings arises from the interaction between exercise of the traditional police power and exercise of eminent domain. The police power is the inherent state government power, to do what is reasonably necessary to promote and protect public health, safety, welfare and morals.

There are numerous instances where the Supreme Court of the United States has found that state courts have reasonably concluded that "the health, safety, morals, or general welfare" would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land. And in this context the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld land-use regulations that adversely affected recognized real property interests.

Zoning laws are the classic example see Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition of brickyard operations within certain neighborhoods) Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (prohibition of industrial use) Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (requirement that portions of parcels be left unbuilt) Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (height restriction), which have been viewed as permissible governmental action even when prohibiting the most beneficial use of the property.

However, zoning restrictions may not deny an owner any economically viable use of his land. Suppose a "low density residential" zone requires that a house have a setback (the distance from the edge of the property to the edge of the building) of no less than 100 feet (30 m). If a particular property were only 100 feet (30 m) deep, it would be impossible to build a house on the property.

Governmental land-use regulation that deny the property owner any economically viable use are deemed a taking of the affected property. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles (1987). The general approach to this question was summed up in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) which states that the application of land-use regulations to a particular piece of property is a taking only "if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests . or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." However, in Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528 (2005), the Supreme Court overruled the "substantially advance" criterion of a taking. When a government regulation effects a taking of private property by such excessive regulation, the owner may initiate inverse condemnation proceedings to recover the just compensation for the taking of his or her property, provided that procedural hurdles have been overcome.

In the early twenty-first century, the concept of regulatory taking became to be used more loosely—outside the constitutional sense—by property rights groups, extending to include regulations that reduce property values by lesser amounts. Ballot initiatives based on this interpretation (such as Oregon's Measure 37) were advanced in at least seven states in the years 2000 to 2006. All these states are in the American west, but a significant portion of the funding for the initiatives came from sources on the east coast. [7]

Inverse condemnation Edit

Inverse condemnation is a term which describes a claim brought against the government in which a property owner seeks compensation for a `taking' of his property under the Fifth Amendment. In states that prohibit uncompensated taking or damaging, physical damage to property is included in this definition. The term "inverse" is used, because usually condemnations are brought by the government. In the inverse condemnation context, it is the property owner who sues the government, alleging a taking (or damaging) of property without just compensation. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 (1981) (Justice Brennan dissenting) United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980).

Legal tender cases Edit

An early case involving interpretation of the Fifth Amendment was the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870) During the American Civil War, the Legal Tender Acts of 1862 and 1863 made paper money a legal substitute for gold and silver, including for the payment of preexisting debts. In Hepburn v. Griswold, the Supreme Court had found the legal tender laws inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution, which prohibited the states from passing "any . law impairing the obligation of contracts." Moreover, the Court had held that an act compelling holders of contracts that called for payment in gold or silver to accept as legal tender "mere promises to pay dollars" was unconstitutional because it deprived "such persons of property without due process of law" under the Fifth Amendment. The Court until this time had rarely found an act of Congress unconstitutional. In 1871, the Court, with two new justices on the bench, reversed itself in the legal tender cases, Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, and declared the Legal Tender Acts constitutional. The Fifth Amendment does not apply to injuries which flow from the exercise of lawful power, the court held, but only to direct appropriation of property.

The fifth amendment. . forbids taking private property for public use without just compensation or due process of law. That provision has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals. A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals great losses may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be charged, or a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared?

Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence Edit

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution extended the protection against uncompensated takings to citizens against their own states. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Early on, the federal courts began the process of gradual incorporation of the bill of rights protections into the fourteenth amendment. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has historically been a major vehicle for the increased federal judicial review of the constitutionality of state activity. We find early justices of the Supreme Court puzzling over this, for example, in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887):

It is not a little remarkable that, while this provision has been in the constitution of the United States as a restraint upon the authority of the federal government for nearly a century, and while during all that time the manner in which the powers of that government have been exercised has been watched with jealousy, and subjected to the most rigid criticism in all its branches, this special limitation upon its powers has rarely been invoked in the judicial forum or the more enlarged theater of public discussion. But while it has been a part of the constitution as a restraint upon the powers of the states only a very few years, the docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that state courts and state legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life, liberty, and property without due process of law. There is here abundant evidence that there exists some strange misconception of the scope of the provision as found in the fourteenth amendment. In fact, it would seem from the character of many of the cases before us, and the arguments made in them, that the clause under consideration is looked upon as a means of bringing to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a state court of justice of the decision against him, and of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be founded.

The Bituminous Coal Association case Edit

Some 65 years later, the Court considered similar Pennsylvania legislation which required that some underground coal be left in place to provide surface support. In the Bituminous Coal case, the State's legislation received a more sympathetic hearing from the Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The Court wrote:

. [T]he character of the governmental action involved here leans heavily against finding a taking the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat to the common welfare. [t]here is no record in this case to support a finding, similar to the one the Court made in Pennsylvania Coal, that the Subsidence Act makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their business. .

The Keystone decision is characterized by deference to the State's determination that its legislation promoted public health and safety:

Under our system of government, one of the State's primary ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others. These restrictions are "properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship".

Notably, the Keystone decision bears four dissents: Justices Rehnquist, Powell, O'Connor and Scalia.

Health and safety takings Edit

Suppose the government must cut a firebreak through a forest upon private property to prevent spread of a forest fire. Or suppose the government destroys healthy livestock in a quarantine area to prevent spread of disease. These are invasive takings, but they do not fall under the per se rule described in a previous section. From the very first, the takings cases recognized that `all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community.' Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887). The most straightforward example of this principle occurs when the government must condemn or destroy property to prevent spread of disease or other threat to the public health or safety.

"Thus, in order to protect the health and safety of the community, government may condemn unsafe structures, may close unlawful business operations, may destroy infected trees, and surely may restrict access to hazardous areas – for example, land on which radioactive materials have been discharged, land in the path of a lava flow from an erupting volcano, or land in the path of a potentially life-threatening flood. When a governmental entity imposes these types of health and safety regulations, it may not be 'burdened with the condition that [it] must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community.'" [8]

Andrus v. Allard Edit

In Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), the Court found that the federal Eagle Protection Act could prohibit the sale of lawfully purchased eagle parts. The Court noted that the Act did not confiscate the owner's property, but rather regulated the terms of sale:

The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them. Rather, a significant restriction has been imposed on one means of disposing of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety. [citations omitted]. In this case, it is crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and transport their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds.

The fact that the statute barred the most profitable use of the property was not sufficient, the Court held:

It is, to be sure, undeniable that the regulations here prevent the most profitable use of appellees' property. Again, however, that is not dispositive. When we review regulation, a reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated with a taking. Compare Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, at 594, and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra. In the instant case, it is not clear that appellees will be unable to derive economic benefit from the artifacts for example, they might exhibit the artifacts for an admissions charge. At any rate, loss of future profits – unaccompanied by any physical property restriction – provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim. Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform. Further, perhaps because of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other property-related interests. Cf., e. g., Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 Yale L. J. 52 (1936).

Agins Edit

One year after the eagle feather decision in Andrus, the Court decided Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In Agins the Court stated that the application of land-use regulations to a particular piece of property is a taking when it denies the land's owner reasonable, viable use of it, or "if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests . or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." After landowners had acquired 5 acres (20,000 m 2 ) of unimproved land in a city for residential development, the city was required by California law to prepare a general plan governing land use and the development of open-space land. In response, the city adopted zoning ordinances that placed the owners' property in a zone in which property may be devoted to one-family dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space uses, with density restrictions permitting appellants to build between one and five single-family residences on their tract. The city expressed its intention to acquire the Agins parcel for open space, and actually commenced condemnation proceedings to take title to it. Later, the city abandoned the condemnation, and adopted the ordinance in issue. Without having sought approval for development of their tract under the ordinances, appellants brought suit against the city in state court, alleging that the city had taken their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The California Supreme Court departed from long-standing California precedent and held that monetary compensation was not available in regulatory taking cases which the court refused to recognize. That holding was eventually overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court a few years later in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).

The U.S. Supreme Court held:

The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), or denies an owner economically viable use of his land, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138, n. 36 (1978). The determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest. Although no precise rule determines when property has been taken, see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), the question necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests. In this case, the law confers a reciprocal benefit: it benefits all landowners, serving the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly development of residential property with provision for open-space areas.

It took Bonnie Agins 30 years of litigation and administrative proceedings before she was permitted to build three houses on her 5-acre (20,000 m 2 ) parcel.

Note that the "substantially advance" element of Agins, was later overruled in the Lingle v. Chevron case, where the court explained that its Agins opinion was mistaken on that point and that the "substantially advance" element was appropriate in substantive due process cases, not taking ones.

Loretto decision Edit

In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled that a regulation is generally considered a per se taking when it forces land owners to endure a permanent physical occupation on their land, such as the permanent physical presence of cable lines on a residential building. The Court held that any permanent physical presence destroyed the property owner's right to exclude, long recognized as one of the key rights in the "bundle of rights" commonly characterized as property. The Court considered a New York statute which required landlords to install CATV cable facilities on the roof of their buildings the facilities were part of a citywide cable network designed to bring cable services to the entire city. The landlords were required to provide a location for 6 feet (1.8 m) of cable one-half inch in diameter and two 4" x 4" x 4" metal boxes at a one-time charge determined by the Cable Commission at $1. The City argued that the Court should apply a balancing test—that the invasion of property was minimal in comparison to the community wide benefit. But the Court's decision suggested that there was a per se rule requiring compensation in cases of this kind. In short, when the "character of the governmental action, is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner."

The dissent in Loretto pointed out that there are circumstances wherein the government may require installation of devices without compensation: ". the States traditionally – and constitutionally – have exercised their police power "to require landlords to . provide utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the like in the common area of a building." These provisions merely ensure tenants access to services the legislature deems important, such as water, electricity, natural light, telephones, inter-communication systems, and mail service. The majority opinion distinguished such requirements because they "do not require the landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his building by a third party."

Bayview Homes Edit

In 1985, the Supreme Court applied its regulatory takings analysis to the Clean Water Act, which prohibits any discharge of dredged or fill materials into "navigable waters"—defined as the "waters of the United States"—unless authorized by a permit issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121. The Corps issued regulations construing the Act to cover all "freshwater wetlands" that are adjacent to other covered waters. These regulations defined the adjacent wetlands as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., began placing fill materials on its property near the shores of Lake St. Clair, Michigan. A Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Corps' interpretation, and suggested that the regulation would create a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

In its decision, the Supreme Court held that in order to be within the regulatory authority of the United States, these semi-aquatic characteristics would have to be the result of frequent flooding by the nearby navigable waters. But the Supreme Court rejected the attempt to narrow the Corps of Engineer's regulatory reach. Perhaps some particular properties might in individual cases be so adversely impacted that a taking might be found. But this would not justify overturning the regulation itself. "Governmental land-use regulation may under extreme circumstances amount to a 'taking' of the affected property. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985) Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). But mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a regulatory taking. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her property does not itself "take" the property in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the property as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable uses available to the owner. "[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to a taking." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) This maxim rests on the principle that so long as compensation is available for those whose property is in fact taken, the governmental action is not unconstitutional.

Hodel v. Irving Edit

Less than a decade after the Andrus decision, the Court found there to be a taking when the government took only a single strand of the bundle of property – the right to pass property to one's heirs. On Indian reservations, property belonging to Native Americans was often fractionated, meaning that with each generation a parcel's ownership could be divided up between more and more heirs, making it extremely difficult to put the property to economic use. To solve this problem, Congress passed the Indian Lands Consolidation Act, stopping interests in land constituting less than 2% of the total ownership from being further divided up through a will or by intestate succession (property that passes without a will upon the death of the owner). Instead such interests would become property of the tribes. In Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a "complete abolition of both the descent and devise of a particular class of property may be a taking." It found that even though only a single strand of the property was affected, it was nevertheless an uncompensated taking that violated the Fifth Amendment. There was some disagreement among the concurring justices whether this decision affected Andrus, with Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Powell finding it limited Andrus to its facts, while Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens opined that Andrus was unaffected. In 1997, the Court found a successor statute similarly unconstitutional as an uncompensated taking in Youpee v. Babbit, 519 U.S. 234 (1997).

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Edit

In the Penn Central case, the Supreme Court had described a three-prong balancing test, which required a case-by-case analysis to determine if there had been a regulatory taking. This meant that it was difficult to predict whether a particular regulation merited compensation. Might there be situations in which there should be a "per se" rule requiring compensation? In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a State regulation that deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial use of that property can be a taking. Lucas had purchased two residential lots on a South Carolina barrier island, intending to build single-family homes such as those on the immediately adjacent parcels. At that time, Lucas's lots were not subject to the State's coastal zone building permit requirements. In 1988, however, the state legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act, which barred Lucas from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his parcels. He filed suit against respondent state agency, contending that, even though the Act may have been a lawful exercise of the State's police power, the ban on construction deprived him of all "economically viable use" of his property and therefore effected a "taking" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that required the payment of just compensation. The court further clarified, however, that a regulation is not a taking if it is consistent with "restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already placed upon ownership." As an example of "background principles," the court referred to the right of government to prevent flooding of others' property. The Court noted:

A review of the relevant decisions demonstrates that the "harmful or noxious use" principle was merely this Court's early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in value that the distinction between regulation that "prevents harmful use" and that which "confers benefits" is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis and that, therefore, noxious-use logic cannot be the basis for departing from this Court's categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated. . Although it seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on Lucas's land, this state-law question must be dealt with on remand. To win its case, respondent cannot simply proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, but must identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses Lucas now intends in the property's present circumstances.

Lucas was remanded to the South Carolina Supreme Court which in turn remanded it to the trial court for a valuation trial. However, the case settled when the state bought Lucas' property, and later resold it to a developer.

Palazzolo Edit

On June 28, 2001, the Court issued its opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). Palazzolo addressed two issues: When is a takings claim ripe? When does notice of a preexisting regulation destroy the right to challenge the application of that regulation? For forty years, the plaintiff's corporation owned a valuable parcel of property in the town of Westerly, Rhode Island. The property consisted of roughly eighteen acres of wetlands and a small indeterminate amount of uplands. The land was divided into seventy-four parcels in two subdivision map filings that occurred in 1936 and 1959. Like the neighboring homes, the only way to develop Mr. Palazzolo's land is to raise the grade with fill.

In 1971, the Rhode Island Legislature authorized the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) to regulate the filling of coastal wetlands. The CRMC promulgated regulations requiring that any filling of coastal salt marsh, such as that found on the plaintiff's property, meet certain public interest requirements. CRMC had ruled that private housing does not meet this public interest requirement. Prior to the adoption of this regulatory regime, the plaintiff applied twice to utilize the property but each time the State withdrew its approval, and the plaintiff did not appeal.

As a preliminary issue the Supreme Court addressed the question whether Palazzolo's case was "ripe" for review by the Courts. The central question, the Court found, was whether the plaintiff had obtained a final decision from the Council determining the permitted use for the land. A number of previous cases had established "the important principle that a landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use authority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach of a challenged regulation:A final decision does not occur until the responsible agency determines the extent of permitted development on the land. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351. But the landowner

On the question of whether the plaintiff could proceed with a taking claim after he acquired the property in his personal capacity from his corporation after the regulations were already in place, the Court held that he could. As Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority said,

Were the Court to accept that rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.

Land-use exactions and permit conditions are governed by the Nollan-Dolan rule. [9] In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court adopted a test to determine when an exaction is a taking: the municipality "must demonstrate an 'essential nexus' between a harm identified with the proposed development and the required exaction." In Dolan, the Court clarified that there had to be a rough proportionality between the exaction and the impact of the proposed development. [10] It has been suggested by scholars that in exaction cases, the government gives the regulation heightened scrutiny akin to rational basis with bite. [3]

Nollan Edit

In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court reviewed a regulation under which the California Coastal Commission demanded a lateral public easement across the plaintiffs' beachfront lot in exchange for a permit to demolish an existing bungalow and replace it with a three-bedroom two-story house. The public easement was designed to connect two public beaches that were separated by property belonging to the plaintiffs and their neighbors. The Coastal Commission had asserted that the public easement condition was imposed to promote the legitimate state interest of diminishing the "blockage of the view of the ocean" caused by construction of the larger house. The Court observed that requiring a dedication of private property in exchange for a building permit was "an out-and-out plan of extortion" unless it could be shown that the private development imposed a burden on public facilities or resources, and the dedication would mitigate such impact. This became known as the "essential nexus" between a legitimate state interest and the permit condition.

Dolan Edit

In Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) the Court evaluated further the degree of the connection required between permit conditions and impacts caused by a development. In that case, a business owner sought to expand a plumbing supply store on property adjacent to a floodplain and sought to pave more parking spaces for the store. The City of Tigard, Oregon, conditioned the building on the owner creating a public greenway and building a bike path on the land. The City justified the conditions as necessary to prevent flooding and traffic congestion. The Supreme Court ruled that the city's requirement would be a taking if the City did not show that there was a reasonable relationship between the creation of the greenway and bike path and the impact of the development. Moreover, such an exaction had to be roughly proportional to the impact. "Without question, had the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a taking would have occurred," the Court held. "Such public access would deprive petitioner of the right to exclude others, "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property." [11]

Koontz v. St. Johns Water Management District Edit

The Nollan and Dolan cases had previously held that permit exactions had to have an essential nexus and be roughly proportional to impacts caused by the permitted development. Both cases involved the dedication of land – an easement in Nollan and a public easement and bicycle path in Dolan. Left unanswered was the question whether an exaction demand of money was subject to the nexus and proportionality tests. In Koontz v. St. Johns Water Management District, [12] The plaintiff sought permission to build a 3.7 acre shopping center on 14.9 acres of property, much of which was wetlands. The Water District agreed to provide the permit so long as Koontz dedicate 11 acres and spend money fixing up the drainage on district property several miles away. Koontz sued, not over the dedication of the land but over the requirement that he spend money on district property. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the holdings of Nollan and Dolan did not apply because they involved exaction demands for land, as opposed to money. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the cases were concerned about demands for property and that because money is a form of property, a monetary exaction is subject to those tests.

Permit exhaustion Edit

One precondition of a regulatory takings claim is that the claimant must obtain a final decision by the regulating entity as to what uses will be permitted. The Supreme Court's decisions make it clear that the mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a regulatory taking. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 293–297(1981).

The reasons are obvious. A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her property does not itself "take" the property in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the property as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable uses available to the owner. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent "economically viable" use of the land in question can it be said that a taking has occurred.

In Palazzolo, the Court held that the case was ripe because Palazzolo had applied for multiple permits and it was clear what could or could not be done with the property.

Per se takings Edit

The United States Supreme Court has established a number of tests under which a state regulation constitutes a taking per se. These are physical invasion (as in Loretto Teleprompter), denial of all economically viable private property uses (as in Lucas), or requiring the owners to dedicate some of their property to the government without a justifying reason for so doing (as in Nollan, Dolan and Koontz). For example, when the owners' proposed land use will result in a significant increase in traffic they may be required to dedicate a strip of their land to improve an adjacent road.

But when an action does not fall into a category addressed by one of these tests, the Court relies primarily on an ad hoc inquiry into the specifics of such individual case. This test was established in Penn Central v. City of New York, which described the most relevant factors to be the owners investment-backed expectations, the economic impact of the regulation, and the character of the government action. This approach has been the subject of much criticism because of its unpredictability.

The denominator problem Edit

In Penn Central, the Supreme Court ruled that takings law does not divide property into discrete segments. Thus, the property interest in question during a taking case is the whole parcel of land and not a discrete sliver of it. This gave rise to the question of what is the "denominator" of the ownership fraction i.e., what is the larger ownership whose part is being subjected to confiscatory regulation, since the regulatory taking of a part of it (the "numerator") is not compensable.

In Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017), the Court held that denominator is best assessed through a multi-factor balancing test that includes such factors as "the treatment of the land, in particular how it is bounded or divided, under state and local law," the "physical characteristics of the landowner’s property," and "the value of the property under the challenged regulation."

The policy underlying the whole parcel rule is that it is "essential to an interpretation of the takings clause that leaves any room for public planning and regulation of land uses." [13]

The development of regulatory takings jurisprudence is notable for the contribution made by public interest advocates from both the conservationist and property rights advocacy camps. One of the more prominent advocates on behalf of property rights has been the Pacific Legal Foundation, which represented the landowners in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Authority, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, Koontz v. St. Johns Water Management District, and Murr v. Wisconsin. Another non-profit, Oregonians in Action, represented Mrs. Dolan in her battle with the City of Tigard. Likewise, Mountain States Legal Foundation represented the landowner in Brandt v. United States, a case where a railroad-right-of-way had been taken by the federal government. On the other side of the debate, the State of Hawaii was represented by Vermont Law School Professor John Echeverria in Lingle v. Chevron, and who has worked with the Audubon Society and Community Rights Council. Both the property rights advocacy organizations and many conservation-oriented organizations have submitted numerous amicus briefs in virtually all the major regulatory takings cases at the Supreme Court as well as in a number of appellate courts. While the property rights advocacy organizations generally argue for greater protections for property rights, and compensation when those rights are taken, the conservation-oriented entities argue that government owes no compensation when it regulates to promote public health, safety and conservation values. [14]

Procedure Steps

Step 01

Introduce yourself, identify your patient and gain consent to speak with them. Should you wish to take notes as you proceed, ask the patients permission to do so.

Step 02 - Presenting Complaint (PC)

This is what the patient tells you is wrong, for example: chest pain.

Step 03 - History of Presenting Complaint (HPC)

Gain as much information you can about the specific complaint.

Sticking with chest pain as an example you should ask:

  • Site: Where exactly is the pain?
  • Onset: When did it start, was it constant/intermittent, gradual/ sudden?
  • Character: What is the pain like e.g. sharp, burning, tight?
  • Radiation: Does it radiate/move anywhere?
  • Associations: Is there anything else associated with the pain, e.g. sweating, vomiting.
  • Time course: Does it follow any time pattern, how long did it last?
  • Exacerbating / relieving factors: Does anything make it better or worse?
  • Severity: How severe is the pain, consider using the 1-10 scale?

The SOCRATES acronym can be used for any type of pain history.

Step 04 - Past Medical History (PMH)

Gather information about a patients other medical problems (if any).

Step 05 - Drug History (DH)

Find out what medications the patient is taking, including dosage and how often they are taking them, for example: once-a-day, twice-a-day, etc.

At this point it is a good idea to find out if the patient has any allergies.

Step 06 - Family History (FH)

Gather some information about the patients family history, e.g diabetes or cardiac history. Find out if there are any genetic conditions within the family, for example: polycystic kidney disease.

Step 07 - Social History (SH)

This is the opportunity to find out a bit more about the patient’s background. Remember to ask about smoking and alcohol. Depending on the PC it may also be pertinent to find out whether the patient drives, e.g. following an MI patient cannot drive for one month. You should also ask the patient if they use any illegal substances, for example: cannabis, cocaine, etc.

Also find out who lives with the patient. You may find that they are the carer for an elderly parent or a child and your duty would be to ensure that they are not neglected should your patient be admitted/remain in hospital.

Step 08 - Review of Systems (ROS)

Gather a short amount of information regarding the other systems in the body that are not covered in your HPC.

The above example involves the CVS so you would focus on the others.

These are the main systems you should cover:

  • CVS
  • Respiratory
  • GI
  • Neurology
  • Genitourinary/renal
  • Musculoskeletal
  • Psychiatry

Please note these are the main areas, however some courses will also teach the addition of other systems such as ENT/ophthalmology.

Step 09 - Summary of History

Complete your history by reviewing what the patient has told you. Repeat back the important points so that the patient can correct you if there are any misunderstandings or errors.

You should also address what the patient thinks is wrong with them and what they are expecting/hoping for from the consultation. A useful acronym for this is ICE [I]deas, [C]oncerns and [E]xpectations.

Step 10 - Patient Questions / Feedback

During or after taking their history, the patient may have questions that they want to ask you. It is very important that you don’t give them any false information. As such, unless you are absolutely sure of the answer it is best to say that you will ask your seniors about this or that you will go away and get them more information (e.g. leaflets) about what they are asking. These questions aren’t necessarily there to test your knowledge, just that you won’t try and ɻlag it'.

Step 11

When you are happy that you have all of the information you require, and the patient has asked any questions that they may have, you must thank them for their time and say that one of the doctors looking after them will be coming to see them soon.

This guide is designed for students and doctors. If you are applying for medical school and would like more information on the UCAT please check out our complete guide and our guide on how to practice for your exam. We've also prepared a UCAT Practice Test to help you prepare for the exam.

Get the session history:

The Get-History cmdlet gets the entries in the session history. The default display shows each command and its ID, which indicates the order in which they ran.

Get entries that include a string:

1 st command: Get-History | Where-Object

2 nd command: Get-History | Where-Object

The first command gets entries in the command history that include the string service.
The first command gets all entries in the session history. The pipeline operator (|) passes the results to the Where-Object cmdlet, which selects only the commands that include service.

The second command gets entries in the command history that include the string help.
The second command gets all entries in the session history. The pipeline operator (|) passes the results to the Where-Object cmdlet, which selects only the commands that include service.

Display the most recent command:

This gets the last command in the command history. The last command is the most recently entered command. This command uses the –Count parameter to display just one command. By default, Get-History gets the most recent commands. This command can be abbreviated to “h -c 1” and is equivalent to pressing the up-arrow key.

Display all the properties of the entries in the history:

Get-History | Format-List -Property *

This displays all of the properties of entries in the session history. The pipeline operator passes the results of a Get-History command to the Format-List cmdlet, which displays all of the properties of each history entry. This includes the ID, status, and start and end times of the command.

Disputes in Eminent Domain

One should not conclude, though, that there are very few disputes in eminent domain cases. To the contrary, there are a lot of them. Those disputes, however, are over the amount of money which should be paid for the property being taken by the condemning authority. That is what the second (just compensation) phase of an eminent domain case is all about.

The purpose of this introductory overview is to provide the reader with a roadmap to understand how eminent domain works. This website is designed to allow the reader to explore these eminent domain issues in greater detail. Since just compensation issues are so vast, we won’t even attempt to address them in this overview. But they are covered extensively in the website, and you are invited to explore them at your leisure.

Even after reading and contemplating the information in this website, many readers are likely to still have unanswered questions. For that reason, we invite those readers to contact us directly with their questions. This is particularly pertinent for those readers who are actually facing a potential taking. Talking to a skilled eminent domain lawyer is the only way to make sure your questions are answered. To encourage readers with potential cases to understand their cases better, we will talk about your case with you, and even analyze it, at no charge.

Changing Venezuela by taking power : the history and policies of the Chavez government

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Rise of the Nazi Party

The grim atmosphere of the early 1930s greatly contributed to the rise of Hitler’s Nazi Party as it left the Germans desperate for a strong leader. They considered the German government to be weak and the actions of Bruning, the chancellor only added to the bitterness of the German nation. They suffered due to the harsh conditions of the Treaty of Versailles and the Great Depression left many with huge financial problems, which were only worsened by the chancellor’s decision to cut unemployment pay and wages. Thanks to a very successful propaganda campaign focused on the poor and the suffering, the Nazi Party rose from only 12 seats in Reichstag in 1928 to becoming the largest party in 1932 with 230 seats.

Hitler's Rise to Power: A Timeline

Adolf Hitler's rise to power began during Germany's interwar period, a time of great social and political upheaval. Within a matter of years, the Nazi Party was transformed from an obscure group to the nation's leading political faction.

April 20: Adolf Hitler is born in Braunau am Inn, Austria-Hungary. His family later moves to Germany.

August: Hitler joins the German military at the start of World War I. Some historians believe this is the result of an administrative error as an Austrian citizen, Hitler should not be allowed to join the German ranks.

October: The military, fearing the blame from an inevitable defeat, encourages a civilian government to form. Under Prince Max of Baden, they sue for peace.

November 11: World War I ends with Germany signing an armistice.

March 23: Benito Mussolini forms the National Fascist Party in Italy. Its success will be a huge influence on Hitler.

June 28: Germany is forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles, which imposes strict sanctions on the country. Anger at the treaty and the weight of reparations will destabilize Germany for years.​

July 31: A socialist interim German government is replaced by the official creation of the democratic Weimar Republic.

September 12: Hitler joins the German Workers’ Party, having been sent to spy on it by the military.

February 24: Hitler becomes increasingly important to the German Workers’ Party thanks to his speeches. The group declares a Twenty-Five Point Program to transform Germany.

July 29: Hitler is able to become chairman of his party, which is renamed the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, or NSDAP.

October 30: Mussolini manages to turn luck and division into an invitation to run the Italian government. Hitler notes his success.

January 27: Munich holds the first Nazi Party Congress.

November 9: Hitler believes the time is right to stage a coup. Aided by a force of SA brownshirts, the support of WW1 leader Erich Ludendorff, and browbeaten locals, he stages the Beer Hall Putsch. It fails.

April 1: Having turned his trial into a grandstand for his ideas and become known across Germany, Hitler is given a derisory five-month prison sentence.

December 20: Hitler is released from jail, where he has written the beginning of "Mein Kampf."

February 27: The NSDAP had moved away from Hitler's influence during his absence now free, he reasserts control, determined to pursue a notionally legal course to power.

April 5: Prussian, aristocratic, right-leaning war leader Paul von Hindenburg is elected president of Germany.

July: Hitler publishes "Mein Kampf," a ranting exploration of what passes as his ideology.

November 9: Hitler forms a personal bodyguard unit separate from the SA, known as the SS.

May 20: Elections to the Reichstag yield just 2.6 percent of the vote to the NSDAP.  

October 4: The New York Stock Market begins to crash, causing a great economic depression in America and around the world. As the German economy was made dependant on the United States by the Dawes plan, it begins to collapse.

January 23: Wilhelm Frick becomes the interior minister in Thuringia, the first Nazi to hold a notable position in the German government.

March 30: Heinrich Brüning takes charge of Germany via a right-leaning coalition. He wishes to pursue a deflationary policy to counter economic depression.

July 16: Facing defeat over his budget, Brüning invokes Article 48 of the constitution, which allows the government to pass laws without Reichstag consent. It is the start of a slippery slope for failing German democracy, and the start of a period of rule by Article 48 decrees.

September 14: Boosted by the rising unemployment rate, the decline of center parties, and a turn to both left and right extremists, the NSDAP wins 18.3 percent of the vote and becomes the second-largest party in the Reichstag.  

October: The Harzburg Front is formed to try to organize Germany’s right wing into a workable opposition to the government and the left. Hitler joins.

January: Hitler is welcomed by a group of industrialists his support is broadening and gathering money.

March 13: Hitler comes a strong second in the presidential elections Hindenburg just misses out on the election on the first ballot.

April 10: Hindenburg defeats Hitler at the second attempt to become president.

April 13: Brüning’s government bans the SA and other groups from marching.

May 30: Brüning is forced to resign Hindenburg is talked into making Franz von Papen chancellor.

June 16: The SA ban is revoked.

July 31: The NSDAP polls 37.4 percent and becomes the largest party in the Reichstag.  

August 13: Papen offers Hitler the post of vice-chancellor, but Hitler refuses, accepting nothing less than being chancellor.

August 31: Hermann Göring, long a leading Nazi and a link between Hitler and the aristocracy, becomes president of the Reichstag and uses his new power to manipulate events.

November 6: In another election, the Nazi vote shrinks slightly.

November 21: Hitler turns down more government offers, wanting nothing less than to be chancellor.

December 2: Papen is forced out, and Hindenburg is influenced into appointing the general, and prime right-wing manipulator, Kurt von Schleicher, chancellor.

January 30: Schleicher is outmaneuvered by Papen, who persuades Hindenburg than Hitler can be controlled the latter is made chancellor, with Papen vice-chancellor.

February 6: Hitler introduces censorship.

February 27: With elections looming, the Reichstag is set on fire by a communist.

February 28: Citing the attack on the Reichstag as evidence of a mass communist movement, Hitler passes a law ending civil liberties in Germany.

March 5: The NSDAP, riding on the communist scare and aided by a now tame police force boosted by masses of SA, polls at 43.9 percent.   The Nazis ban the communists.

March 21: During the "Day of Potsdam," the Nazis open the Reichstag in a carefully stage-managed act which tries to show them as heirs of the Kaiser.

March 24: Hitler passes the Enabling Act it makes him a dictator for four years.

July 14: With other parties banned or splitting up, the NSDAP becomes the only political party left in Germany.

June 30: During the "Night of the Long Knives," dozens are killed as Hitler shatters the power of the SA, which had been challenging his goals. SA leader Ernst Röhm is executed after trying to merge his force with the army.

July 3: Papen resigns.

August 2: Hindenburg dies. Hitler merges the posts of chancellor and president, becoming the supreme leader of Nazi Germany.

Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The History and Policies of the Chavez Government

At first I was fairly skeptical about this book based on my disillusionment with Chavez&aposs cult of personality that I witnessed while living in Venezuela, but read it on a highly regarded recommendation. I was not surprised that Greg Wilpert&aposs (editor of view of Chavez&aposs government is rosier than mine, meaning i think he overstates the accomplishments and understates the pitfalls of the regime. What did surprise me, however, was both the depth of information here (covering h At first I was fairly skeptical about this book based on my disillusionment with Chavez's cult of personality that I witnessed while living in Venezuela, but read it on a highly regarded recommendation. I was not surprised that Greg Wilpert's (editor of view of Chavez's government is rosier than mine, meaning i think he overstates the accomplishments and understates the pitfalls of the regime. What did surprise me, however, was both the depth of information here (covering historical background, a wide range of policy, as well as social and cultural critique) and the well-reasoned and balanced approach taken. Thankfully Wilpert does not shy away from criticizing Chavez and the Venezuelan government for its shortcomings, while also defending them against right-wing attacks.

The book can be a bit dry because of all the policy details, so if you read it feel free to skip around to the sections that appear interesting. My favorites were the section on Internal and External Obstacles, and the Appendix on "21st Century Socialism" which contains an actually really great overview of the problems with capitalism and what passed for socialism in the 19th-20th centuries. . more

A text that reminds me of the European brown noses, say Sartre, when it was about talking about Stalin. Another text glorifying a murderous dictator and looking at the lackluster achievements.

> With regard to the first element, the Chavez government has been able to increase both its oil revenues and its non-oil revenues, except for during the two crisis years.

So the dictator increased the non-oil revenues. How? Well, obviously he was making sport shoes for Nike at night and pimping his military A text that reminds me of the European brown noses, say Sartre, when it was about talking about Stalin. Another text glorifying a murderous dictator and looking at the lackluster achievements.

> With regard to the first element, the Chavez government has been able to increase both its oil revenues and its non-oil revenues, except for during the two crisis years.

So the dictator increased the non-oil revenues. How? Well, obviously he was making sport shoes for Nike at night and pimping his military uniform at day. How about the oil revenue? He, in his infinite wisdom, knew who to ask to increase the volume of petrol pumped out for the sake of the generations to come. And he did that so well, unless the price of oil was dropping. And the output was so spectacular he was unable to repay the government debt. But that is a conspiracy from the Reptilian overlords, so it does not count for Wilpert. . more

Well-researched analysis of Chavez&aposs policies as well as Venezuela. It contributes to correct the current excessively distorted and &aposdemonized&apos character of Chavez, and presents &aposhonest&apos information with constructive criticisms toward Chavez&aposs initiatives and programs while also presenting various advantages in these policies.

It would be great to combine this book with Eva Golinger, which focuses on how and why we get such a negative reporting and statements regarding Chavez (and Venezuela) from Well-researched analysis of Chavez's policies as well as Venezuela. It contributes to correct the current excessively distorted and 'demonized' character of Chavez, and presents 'honest' information with constructive criticisms toward Chavez's initiatives and programs while also presenting various advantages in these policies.

It would be great to combine this book with Eva Golinger, which focuses on how and why we get such a negative reporting and statements regarding Chavez (and Venezuela) from the US mainstream media, the government as well as some notorious NGOs supported by some segments of the US governments by using various dirty methods. . more

Watch the video: Πρωτοσέλιδα Ιστορία, ΕΤ1, Συμφωνία της Βάρκιζας, Μέρος 1ο (May 2022).